AIN:存算一體化公鏈：Subspace Network 白皮書 ( Ⅰ )_THE

本文轉載自SubBase。

Subspace Network 是Web3上支持大規模可擴展，同時提供存算一體化底層基礎設施服務的模塊化Layer-1，在此基礎上，Subspace Network將致力于增強和連接其他區塊鏈生態系統。

Roadmap:

2018年-2019年：獲美國國家科學基金會 Grant 資助以及 Candaq Fintech Group, OneBoat Capital 等的早期支持

2021年：發布 Whitepaper，獲得 Web3 基金會 Grant，$4.5 million fund raising led by Hypersphere and Stratos Technologies（Seed Round）

2022年：$33 million fund raising led by Pantera Capital & CoinBase（Strategic Round）

以下為Subspace Network中英文對照版白皮書 (Ⅰ) 。

Subspace: A Solution to the Farmer’s Dilemma

Subspace：解放被困的硬盤農民

第一章 背景

Nakamoto-style blockchains, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum , , combine the longest-chain fork-choice rule with a proof-of-work (PoW) mining puzzle. These systems are provably secure, with respect to safety and liveness, given an honest majority of miners.

在目前的區塊鏈世界中經典的中本聰式的區塊鏈，如比特幣和以太坊，他們無不是結合了最長鏈主鏈分叉決定原則和工作量證明（PoW）的算力博弈。這些系統也被證明是安全且可靠的，同時保持著相當程度的活躍，當然這很大程度上歸功于大部分的工人都是誠實的。

Unlike legacy Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) consensus algorithms, participation is both permissionless and scalable. These properties are the standard against which all new blockchain consensus protocols are measured. 

與傳統的拜占庭容錯（BFT）共識算法不同，網絡的參與雙方是無需許可和可擴展的。這些屬性是衡量所有新的區塊鏈共識協議的標準。

Unfortunately, the security afforded by PoW comes at a massive cost in electricity. Collectively, miners on Bitcoin and Ethereum consume the energy budget of a medium-sized country, with these numbers steadily increasing as more capital flows into the system.

令人惋惜的是，目前PoW提供的高安全性是以巨大的電力成本為代價的。總的來說，比特幣和以太坊上的礦工消耗了一個中等國家的能源預算，同時隨著更多的資本流入該系統，這些電力以及各種綜合成本會逐步增加。

This raises the critical question of whether cryptocurrencies can reach wide scale adoption without adding more fuel to the fire of global warming. Moreover, while mining was originally envisioned as a democratic and egalitarian process, as expressed by one-CPU-one-vote, it quickly became a highly commoditized and centralized enterprise.

AMF根據MiCA規則為現有加密貨幣公司提供快速通道注冊:金色財經報道，法國金融市場管理局(AMF)在周五的一份聲明中表示，現有的加密公司可以獲得新的歐洲加密規則的“快速通道制度”。在FTX崩潰之后，法國最近加強了其加密注冊程序，并為歐盟的加密資產市場法MiCA做準備。[2023/4/24 14:23:46]

這就提出了一個關鍵問題，即加密貨幣能否在低功耗，環境友好，不加劇全球變暖的情況下被廣泛認可且采用。此外，雖然采礦最初被設想為一個民主且平等的過程，例如“每cpu一票”這樣的設計，但好景不長，它很快就變成了高度商品化和集中化的產業。

Today participation in Bitcoin mining instead follows one-ASIC-one-vote, assuming a miner also Research conducted with support from NSF-SBIR Grant 1844037 has access to low-cost electricity. Ethereum mining sought to circumvent this by adopting one-GPU-one-vote, but this too has proven susceptible to special purpose hardware and still has the tendency to concentrate in regions with low-cost electricity. This raises another key question of whether or not existing cryptocurrencies are actually decentralized, or if we have simply substituted one trusted third-party (financial institutions) for another (mining pools).

如今，比特幣采礦的參與已經被“一ASIC（專用集成電路）一票”給取代，假設一個礦工也在NSF-SBIR Grant 1844037的支持下進行研究，可以獲得低成本的電力。以太坊采礦試圖通過采用“每GPU一票”來規避這一問題，但這也被證明容易受到特殊用途硬件的影響，并且產業仍然傾向于集中在電力成本較低的地區。這就提出了另一個關鍵問題，即現有的加密貨幣是否實際上是去中心化的，或者我們是否只是簡單地將一個受信任的第三方（金融機構）替換為另一個（礦池）。

These challenges have served as a rallying cry for a di-verse group of hackers, researchers, and engineers who have sought to design a sustainable blockchain that holds true to Nakamoto’s vision for a more democratic and decentralized future. The most well-known solution to this problem is proof-of-stake (PoS), which employs a system of virtual mining based on one’s wealth, under the adage one-coin-one-vote. While PoS clearly solves the ustainability problem, it doesnot hold true to Nakamoto’s vision. It instead reflects a permissioned and plutocratic alternative, which also exhibits strong tendencies towards centralization. 

上述這些挑戰成為了一群不同的黑客、研究人員和工程師的戰斗口號，他們試圖設計一個可持續發展的區塊鏈，以實現中本聰對更加民主和去中心化未來的愿景。這個問題最著名的解決方案是權益證明（PoS），它采用基于個人財富的虛擬采礦系統，俗稱“一幣一票”。雖然 PoS 清晰地解決了可持續性問題，但它并不符合中本聰最初的愿景。相反，它反映了一種獲得許可的財閥式的替代方案，它也表現出強烈的集中化趨勢。

報告：Immutable X 游戲2022年獲得超過9億美元投資:金色財經報道，Immutable X獨家游戲籌集了約3億美元，而基于Immutable X的多鏈游戲在2022年籌集了超過6億美元。有了這些投資，Immutable X在2022年超過了Solana和Polygon，成為了資金最多的二層Web3游戲生態系統。根據報告，Immutable X在這一年中從5款游戲發展到100多款游戲。Polygon緊隨Immutable X緊隨其后，獲得了8.5億美元的融資。Polygon的多鏈游戲獲得了近7.5億美元的收入，比Immutable X的多鏈游戲多了近1.5億美元。然而，polygon獨家游戲的表現相對較差，全年的收入僅超過1.5億美元。[2023/1/17 11:15:20]

In fact, PoS systems serve to magnify the existing wealth disparity in cryptocurrencies, which are already significantly larger than historically high disparities in global fiat wealth distribution, effectively serving to make the rich even richer. What is instead needed is a cryptographic proof system based on an underlying resource that is already massively distributed and which does not lend itself to special-purpose hardware.

事實上，PoS系統會進一步放大加密貨幣中現有的財富差距，這種差距已經遠遠大于全球法定財富分配的歷史最高差距，這有效地使富人變得更加富有。相反，我們需要的是一種基于底層資源的加密證明系統，該底層資源需要已經被大規模分布，并且不適合專用集成硬件。

Enter proof-of-capacity (PoC), which replaces compute-intensive mining with storage-intensive farming, under the maxim one-disk-one-vote. Disk-based consensus seems like an obvious choice, as storage hardware has long been commoditized, consumes negligible electricity, and exists in abundance across end-user devices. As it turns out, implementing a PoC such that it does not devolve back into PoW, without resorting to a permissioned model, is highly non-trivial, as witnessed by the paucity of live chains to date. Moreover, all existing PoC blockchain designs fail to address a critical mechanism design challenge, to which we turn next.

在“一盤一票”的原則下，容量證明（PoC）用存儲密集型農業取代了計算密集型的耕種。基于磁盤形成的共識似乎是一個顯而易見的選擇，因為存儲硬件早已商品化，消耗的電力可以忽略不計，并且在終端用戶設備中大量存在。事實證明，在不采用許可模型的情況下，實施PoC以使其不會退回到PoW是非常重要的，正如目前我們所知道的，這樣的鏈非常稀少。此外，所有現有的PoC區塊鏈設計都無法解決關鍵的機制設計挑戰，我們接下來要征服這個挑戰。

第二章 農民困境

Amber Group回應：無許可池運行正常:11月9日消息，Amber Group就“多家機構被 Clearpool打上警告標簽”一事進行回應表示，根據Clearpool官網實時信息顯示，Amber Group以太坊上無許可池運行正常。

此前，據CoinDesk報道稱，Amber Group等多家機構在Clearpool信貸池達到最大值，收到“警告”標簽。[2022/11/9 12:37:04]

Observe that in any PoC blockchain a farmer is, by defifinition, incentivized to allocate as much of its scarce storage resources as possible towards consensus. Contrast this with the desire for all full nodes to reserve storage for maintaining both the current state and history of the blockchain.

在任何PoC區塊鏈中，根據定義，農民被激勵盡可能多地將其稀缺的存儲資源分配給共識。這與所有完整節點為維護區塊鏈的當前狀態和歷史而保留存儲的愿望形成了對比。

These competing requirements pose a challenge to farmers: do they adhere to the desired behavior, retaining the state and history, or do they seek to maximize their own rewards, instead dedicating all available space towards consensus? When faced with this farmer’s dilemma rational farmers will always choose the latter, effectively becoming light clients, while degrading both the security and decentralization of the network.

這些相互競爭的要求對農民帶來了挑戰：他們是堅持所期望的行為而保留狀態和歷史，還是尋求個人回報最大化，而將所有可用的空間用于達成共識？當面對這種農民困境時，理性的農民總是會選擇后者，成為輕客戶以提升個人效率，同時降低了網絡的安全性和去中心化。

This implies that any PoC blockchain would eventually consolidate into a single large farming pool, with even greater speed than has been previously observed with PoW and PoS chains.

這意味著任何PoC區塊鏈最終都會合并成一個大型“耕種池（Farming Pool）”，其速度甚至比之前用PoW和PoS鏈觀察到的還要快。

Recall that in any Nakamoto-style blockchain, a new consensus node must synchronize the chain state from genesis, in order to be assured they are actually on the longest valid chain, which implies the availability of the chain history. If a large fraction of nodes stores the history, this data will be readily available, and the network may be considered decentralized.

回想下在任何中本聰式的區塊鏈中，一個新的共識節點必須從創世開始同步鏈的狀態，以確保他們在最長的有效鏈上，這意味著鏈上歷史的可用性。如果有很大一部分節點儲存了歷史，這些數據將很容易獲得，網絡也實現了去中心化。

Tornado.cash社區駁回將5萬枚TORN折價20%后拍賣并鎖倉1年的提案:7月5日消息，借貸市場協議WePiggy創始人Ron今日發推文稱：“去中心化混幣協議Tornado.cash出現了第一個被社區駁回的提案。該提案希望將50,000枚TORN以1inch市價折價20%的幅度進行為期14天的代幣拍賣。該部分代幣在購買后需鎖倉1年，但享有質押收益和投票權利。提案討論階段就有社區成員明確提出，這個提案不合理。考慮到目前TORN質押挖礦的收益就有兩位數APY，20%的折扣交換一年鎖倉簡直是白給，更有懷疑是團隊的利益輸送或套利行為，以及這個提案會讓TORN在熊市的幣價雪上加霜。”

Ron提醒到，若是其他項目在熊市可能也就悄悄通過并執行了，因此熊市更應該警惕DeFi項目的治理攻擊。[2022/7/5 1:51:41]

However, as time goes by and the history grows, the storage burden on all full nodes grows as well, and some nodes may choose to prune the history, instead only storing the current state of the chain. This trend was already clear in the Bitcoin network as early as 2014 . If full nodes do not store the history, new nodes must instead rely on altruistic archival nodes or third-party data stores for initial synchronization, resulting in a more centralized network. In a PoC blockchain farmers have nothing to gain by storing the history, but clearly stand to lose out on block rewards, especially as the history grows, consuming a larger fraction of their available disk space.

然而，隨著時間的推移和歷史的增長，所有完整節點上的儲存負擔也會增加，一些節點可能會選擇刪除歷史，僅保留鏈的當前狀態。這種趨勢早在2014年的比特幣網絡中就已經很明顯了。如果完整節點不儲存歷史記錄，那么新節點必須依賴利他的存檔節點或第三方數據存儲進行初始同步，從而導致網絡更中心化。在PoC區塊鏈中，農民通過存儲歷史沒有任何好處，反而會失去區塊獎勵，特別是隨著歷史記錄的增加，可用磁盤空間的消耗也越來越大。

In order to extend the longest valid chain and collect fees for valid transactions, a farmer must maintain the memoized state of the chain. As the state is often too large to reside in memory, it too must compete with consensus for precious disk space. While perhaps negligible for low-throughput UTXO style chains, state storage is signifificant for any EVM style chain, or any chain which seeks base layer scalability. Furthermore, all farmers are also required to compute the state transition for each new block as part of the ongoing verifification process, imposing a non-negligible computational overhead, which conflflicts with the desire for farming to be a lightweight task. The farmer’s dilemma then serves to exacerbate the well known verififier’s dilemma, by further raising the opportunity cost of verifification .

分析師：BlockFi或將在2022年底發生流動性危機:6月17日消息，DeFi分析師otteroooo發推表示，BlockFi或將在2022年底發生流動性危機，并表示目前因為Celsius以及三箭資本事件BlockFi已經損失了大量資金。[2022/6/17 4:33:55]

為了延長最長的有效鏈并收取有效交易的費用，農民必須保持該鏈的記憶狀態。由于狀態通常太大，無法儲存在內存中，它也必須與共識爭奪寶貴的磁盤空間。雖然對于低通量的UTXO鏈來說可能可以忽略不計，但狀態存儲對于任何EVM鏈或任何尋求底層可擴展性的鏈都是非常重要的。此外，作為正在進行的驗證過程的一部分，所有農民還需要計算每個新區塊的狀態轉換，造成了不可忽視的計算開銷，這與農民執行輕量級任務的愿望相沖突。農民困境進一步提高了驗證的機會成本，從而加劇了眾所周知的驗證者困境。

If a farmer is willing to adopt a weaker security model, they may instead join a trusted farming pool, whereby they delegate transaction verifification and block proposing functions to an operator, while the farmer focuses solely on evaluating the block challenge against their plots. This has the added benefifit of drastically reducing the computational overhead required to participate in consensus, which fifits with the ideal of many small farmers pledging unused disk space on their home computers. When a farmer fifinds a valid solution to the block challenge, they send it to the pool operator, who forges the new block in return for a portion of the block reward. As long as the fee is lower than the opportunity cost of local block production, a rational farmer would always choose to join a pool. In PoW blockchains this choice is largely dictated by a desire for a smoother reward function, since, unlike joining a farming pool, joining a mining pool does not increase one’s total rewards.

如果農民愿意采用較弱的安全模式，他們可以加入一個可信的耕種池，即他們將交易驗證和區塊提議功能委托給運營商，而農民只專注于評估針對其地塊的區塊挑戰。這樣做的額外好處是，大幅減少了參與共識所需的計算開銷，滿足了許多小農民在他們的家用電腦上利用未使用的磁盤空間的理想。當農民找到一個有效的區塊挑戰解決方案時，他們會將其發送給耕種池運營商，后者鑄造新的區塊以換取一部分區塊獎勵。只要費用低于本地區塊生產的機會成本，理性的農民總是會選擇加入池子。在PoW區塊鏈中，這種選擇很大程度上取決于對更平滑的獎勵功能的渴望，因為與加入一個耕種池不同，加入一個礦池并不會增加一個人的總回報。

The chief problem with this model is that it is not decentralized. Although the actual consensus hardware is highly distributed, compared to existing PoW mining pools, the operators still present a point of centralization, more akin to validators in delegated or nominated PoS protocols. However, PoS systems at least provide strong penalties for misbehavior, which have worked in practice so far. As farmers in the pooled model are at best acting as light clients, the scope of action for malicious or colluding operators is much higher than in a typical blockchain. The honest majority farmer assumption becomes an honest majority operator assumption. If that assumption does not hold, farmers, and most users, will be unable to distinguish between valid and fraudulent transactions which appear in the longest chain, allowing operators to create coins out of thin air or spend farmer and user funds at will.

這個模型的主要問題是它不是去中心化的。盡管實際的共識硬件是高度分布的，但與現有的PoW礦池相比，運營商仍然是一個中心化的點，更類似于委托或提名的PoS協議中的驗證者。然而，PoS系統至少為不當行為提供了強有力的懲罰，這在迄今為止的實踐中已經奏效。由于池化模型中的農民充其量只能作為輕客戶，因此運營商的惡意或串通行動范圍會比典型的區塊鏈要高得多。多數農民是誠實的假設變成了多數運營商是誠實的假設。如果這種假設不成立，農民和大多數用戶將無法區分在最長鏈中的有效交易和欺詐性交易，從而允許運營商憑空創建幣或者隨意花費農民和用戶的資金。

PoC blockchain design appears to stuck on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, we may abandon the goal of having farmers retain the history, while doing everything possible to minimize the burden of maintaining the state such that that the opportunity costs of running a full node remain negligible, giving farmers little incentive to pool. This leads to a much more limited construction, ruling out stateful smart contracts and even modest base layer scalability. On the other hand, we can abandon Nakamoto’s vision and accept pooled consensus as a necessary evil, as has largely been done within the PoW and PoS communities, while at least rejoicing in the fact that participation is now fair and sustainable.

PoC區塊鏈的設計似乎陷入了進退兩難的境地。一方面，我們可以放棄讓農民保留歷史的目標，同時盡一切可能將維護狀態的負擔最小化，從而使運行一個完整節點的機會成本仍然可以忽略不計，讓農民沒有什么動力去匯集。這導致了一個更有限的結構，排除了有狀態的智能合約和適度的基礎層擴展性。另一方面，我們可以放棄中本聰的愿景，將池化共識接受為一種必要之惡，就像PoW和PoS社區所做的那樣，同時為現在的參與是公平和可持續的而感到高興。

In this work we present a third option, which circumvents the farmer’s dilemma without sacrifificing the security or decentralization of the network, organized as follows:

在這項工作中，我們提出了第三種選擇，在不犧牲網絡的安全性或去中心化的情況下，規避了農民困境。觀點如下：

1) To prevent farmers from discarding the history, we construct a novel PoC consensus protocol based on proofs-of-storage of the history of the blockchain itself, in which each farmer stores as many provably-unique replicas of the chain history as their disk space allows.

1）為了防止農民丟棄歷史，我們構建了一個基于區塊鏈本身歷史存儲證明的新型PoC共識協議，每個農民在其磁盤空間允許的情況下存儲盡可能多的，可證明是唯一的鏈上歷史副本。

2) To ensure the history remains available, farmers form a decentralized storage network, which allows the history to remain fully-recoverable, load-balanced, and effificiently-retrievable.

2）為了確保歷史的可用性，農民形成了一個分散的存儲網絡，使歷史保持完全可恢復、負載平衡和有效檢索。

3) To relieve farmers of the burden of maintaining the state and preforming redundant computation, we apply the classic technique in distributed systems of decoupling consensus and computation. Farmers are then solely responsible for the ordering of transactions, while a separate class of executor nodes maintain the state and compute the transitions for each new block.

3）為了減輕農民維護狀態和進行冗余計算的負擔，我們采用了分布式系統中的經典技術，將共識和計算解耦。此后，農民只負責交易的排序，而另一類執行者節點則維護狀態并計算每個新區塊的轉換。

4) To ensure executors remain accountable for their actions, we employ a system of staked deposits, verififiable computation, and non-interactive fraud proofs.

4）為了確保執行者對其行為負責，我們采用了一個由押金、可驗證的計算和非交互式欺詐證明組成的系統。

For concreteness, we present this approach within the Ethereum model of a fully-programmable, account-based blockchain, which periodically commits to the state of all accounts within the block header, though we believe many of the proposed techniques could be applied more generally for any Nakamoto-style blockchain.

具體而言，我們在以太坊模型中提出這種方法，即完全可編程的、基于賬戶的區塊鏈，它將定期提交區塊頭內所有賬戶的狀態。我們相信，此中的許多技術也可以更廣泛地應用于任何中本聰風格的區塊鏈。

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